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Abstract: Writable XOR eXecutable (W○+ X) and 
Address Space Layout Randomisation (ASLR), have 
elevated the understanding necessary to perpetrate 
buffer overflow exploits [1]. However, they have not 
proved to be a panacea [1] [2] [3] and so other 
mechanisms such as stack guards and prelinking have 
been introduced.  In this paper we show that host based 
protection still does not offer a complete solution.  To 
demonstrate, we perform an over the network brute 
force return-to-libc attack against a pre-forking 
concurrent server to gain remote access to a shell.  The 
attack defeats host protection including W○+ X and 
ASLR.  We then demonstrate that deploying a NIDS 
with appropriate signatures can detect this attack 
efficiently. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nearly all internet worms are facilitated through the 
exploit of buffer overflow vulnerabilities [4] and the 
threat of buffer overflow exploits continues to dominate 
as the most severe and frequent [5].   Buffer overflow 
vulnerabilities have been exploited for over 20 years and 
continue to evolve [6] despite innovative progress with 
host based protection mechanisms.  
Buffer overflow attacks are made possible through 
absent or erroneous bounds checking of user input data.  
These vulnerabilities only exist when developing   
software   using   languages which do not enforce run-
time bounds checking such as C and C++. These two 
languages account for more software than any other [7], 
exacerbating the problem. 
The software industry has responded to these types 
of attacks by releasing patches for their applications.  
These code corrections are released at a point where the 
vulnerability becomes known, usually after it has been 
penetrated, and this leads to a patch-penetrate cycle of 
software security [8].  Unfortunately this treats the 
symptom rather than the underlying cause.  
Consequently systems remain vulnerable to attacks 
perpetrated prior to the software vendor being aware of 
any vulnerability (zero day attacks).   
A. Buffer overflow protection 
      Since the first reported buffer overflow attack, the 
Morris worm in 1988 [9], system designers have been 
developing protection mechanisms to eradicate them.  
Most have proposed host based protection mechanisms 
which prevent changes to program execution flow e.g. 
StackGuard [10] and Propolice [11].  Other techniques 
involve modifying the CPU and operating system e.g. 
ASLR and W○+ X.  However, while the safeguards have 
raised the bar significantly, the attackers continue 
finding creative ways to defeat them.  Reactive 
protection mechanisms cannot prevent human error, thus 
the solution may be better design and testing of software 
or the use of languages that enforce run-time bounds 
checking.  This philosophy is creditable but also 
expensive [12], and is unlikely to be done at the cost of 
performance [13].  It seems almost inevitable that buffer 
overflows will continue to emerge as a result of human 
error either via the generation of new vulnerable code or 
the re-use of legacy vulnerable code.  In either case the 
root cause is putting performance before security. 
B. NIDS and Shell code detection 
A popular method of mitigating the risk of buffer 
overflow attacks is through the use of Network 
Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS).  NIDS’s monitor 
network traffic for suspicious activity by examining 
packets for patterns indicative of known exploits.  This 
is performed by placing the systems at key points within 
the network, to scan as much relevant inbound and 
outbound traffic as necessary [14].  Many inventive 
proposals have be made in this area including the use of 
Artificial Intelligence to predict attacks [15] 
Often malicious parties intend to gain remote access 
to a system via a system shell.  They can then perform a 
number of malicious activities, including the 
introduction of root kits, which facilitate easier future 
access to the remote system.  As a result various IDS 
rules have been developed to detect the injection of 
shell code into applications [16] [17].  Most of these 
involve techniques to either detect or obfuscate shell 
code, respectively. 
 
 
 1) Present NIDS and Shell code detection 
limitations 
The release dates of rules for software vulnerabilities 
are often close to that of the patch.  Hence the 
application may be susceptible to zero day attacks [18]. 
In addition, other attack methods which make use of 
buffer overflow vulnerabilities also exist e.g. return-to-
libc.   These attacks use code already loaded in memory 
and do not need to inject shell code [5].  This renders 
many shell code detection rules useless. Wide scale host 
based protection mechanisms such as (W○+ X) and 
ASLR have been implemented to prevent these types of 
attacks, however scenarios exist where they can be 
perpetrated.  One of these, brute force attacks against 
pre-forking daemons [2], will be the primary focus of 
this paper  
C. Organisation of paper 
The remainder of this paper is constructed as 
follows.  Section II discusses the threat posed by buffer 
overflow attacks and how mainstream protection 
mechanisms attempt to protect against them. In Section 
III, we explain and demonstrate through simulation, how 
the implementation of (W○+ X) and ASLR still leaves a 
residual threat.  This threat, namely that posed by pre-
forking concurrent servers, is proved through a 
demonstration of our own brute force return-to-libc 
attack.  In Section IV we exhibit protection mechanisms 
that attempt to prevent this type of attack variant, 
discussing their efficiency and short comings.  In 
Section V we explain the role Intrusion Detection 
Systems might play in obviating these attacks and create 
some generic rules, implemented in Snort [19], which 
could be used to detect them.  We then test these rules 
using real-world traffic and report our findings in section 
VI.  In section VII, we offer our conclusions. 
II. BUFFER OVERFLOW ATTACKS AND PROTECION 
MECHANISMS 
Structural programming languages such as C use 
procedures and functions to alter the flow of execution 
of a program, this takes place when a procedure is 
“called”.  Procedures and functions may have their own 
local variables, allocated at runtime, along with other 
variable values that are passed into their parameters as 
arguments.  They may also return values to the calling 
procedure when necessary.  When a procedure or 
function has finished processing, the path of execution 
will return to the point immediately after the instruction 
which called the procedure.  The stack is used to keep 
track of the flow of program execution and the 
procedure’s local variables and parameters.  In essence it 
is used as temporary storage with values pushed onto it 
when the function/procedure is called (the prologue) and 
popped off when the procedure returns (the epilogue) 
[20].  The information stored on the stack for a called 
procedure is referred to as its stack frame.  The 
following figure shows the stack layout after a code 
injection buffer overflow attack has taken place.  The 
extensible base pointer (EBP) or frame pointer, is used 
to locate components on the stack frame as offsets, and 
NOPS are assembler operations that do not perform any 
operation other than moving to the next instruction in the 
sequence.   
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Fig.1 Stack state after a traditional attack 
In Fig. 1 memory reserved for the buffer has been 
flooded such that shellcode and a number of nops (no-op 
sled) have been injected onto the stack.  In addition the 
return address has been overwritten with the predicted 
address for the shellcode.  If this predicted address is 
inaccurate then flow of execution may be resumed from 
an area of the no-op sled where it will proceed through 
each no-op instruction until it ultimately reaches and 
then executes the shellcode.    Thus the flow of 
execution would be re-directed as a result of the 
vulnerable functions epilog. 
The same result can be achieved by modifying 
function pointer arguments which point to the address of 
a function [21] or by changing the saved frame pointer 
to point to a frame with a compromised return address 
[22].  These vulnerabilities are available since C and 
C++ [23] allow the use of arrays and pointers without 
bounds checking, when this is combined with the c- 
libraries dangerous string functions e.g. strcpy, strcat, 
sprint, gets, which terminate based on a null character 
rather than a defined number of bytes, the buffer can be 
overflowed. 
A. Host based protection mechanisms 
Host based protection consist of compilation, CPU, 
and operating system mechanisms.   The most prominent 
are W○+ X, ASLR and stack based buffer overrun.   
These protection mechanisms along with the attacks that 
are designed to obviate their functionality are discussed 
in the sections immediately following 
1. W○+ X   
W ○+ X allows the processor to mark memory 
locations which should not contain executable code, e.g. 
the stack and heap, as Write XOR eXecute [24]. That is 
they can be written to or executed, but not both. It is also 
referred to as Data Execution Prevention (DEP).  The 
intention is to ensure that the return address would only 
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point to the address of trusted code [25].  However it can 
be bypassed using the return-to-libc method. 
 
a) Return-to-libc attack 
This attack uses addresses of c-library functions 
already loaded into memory. Thus it avoids placing 
executable code on the stack, evading W○+ X.  An 
example of the state of the stack is shown in fig. 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2. Stack of stack after a return-to-libc attack 
Fig. 2 shows that once the vulnerable function returns it 
will execute the system function and parameter.   
Defeating W○+ X using the return-to-libc technique 
inspired the creation of ASLR [26]. 
2) Address Space Layout Randomisation 
ASLR randomises the base address of the stack, 
heap, code, memory mapped segments of executables, 
and dynamic libraries at load and link time [27].  Return-
to-libc attacks are defeated through c-library address 
randomisation at execution.  However, this isn’t entirely 
dependable, elements of the operating system may be 
protected, but not all third party applications are 
appropriately compiled for ASLR and remain vulnerable 
to existing code attacks such as dynamic link library 
(dll) and binary trampolining [28]. 
a) dll and binary trampolining 
Due to oversight, incompatibilities, or in an effort to 
increase performance, some applications aren’t compiled 
to use ASLR.  The binary processes address space, or 
related dll’s, will contain known addresses of operator 
codes. If they contain a buffer overflow vulnerability, 
these addresses can be injected onto the stack and used 
to change the flow of program execution.   These types 
of attack can be foiled by W○+ X or stack based buffer 
overrun protection. 
3) C Library Address Posistioning 
The Openwall Project [29]  produced a Linux kernel 
patch which ensures the c-library address is loaded into 
memory under 0x10000000 [30].  This affords some 
protection from return-to-libc attacks as the c-library 
function address to be injected will contain null bytes.  
This can cause malicious strings to terminate 
prematurely.  The patch was released in September 2002 
[29] yet it has not implemented by default in most Linux 
distributions e.g. Ubuntu 9. 
4) Stack based buffer overrun protection 
Stack based buffer overrun protection adds a 
compilation stage transforming the program in an 
attempt to meet the ideal stack model [22], see fig. 3.  
An interpretation of this, Stack Smashing Protection 
(SSP),  has been included in GCC since version 4.1 [31].   
In fig. 3, the stack is shown amended compared to fig. 1. 
A guard is placed on the stack prior to the buffer to 
protect the values preceding it from an overflow i.e. the 
frame pointer, return address and function’s arguments.  
This is facilitated by GCC recording the size of the 
buffer and adding specific code to the object. This code 
inserts a guard and guard inspection mechanism.  
Alteration of the guard at runtime causes the process to 
terminate with an error message.  In addition, local 
variables are arranged on the stack after the buffer, thus 
protecting function pointers from overwrites [22].  
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Fig.3 Ideal stack model 
This defense is not flawless however.  A common 
method of circumnavigating this is via SEH (Structured 
Exception Handling) attacks [32] .   
III. PREFORKING SERVERS OFFERING A RESIDUAL 
BUFFER OVERFLOW THREAT 
ASLR can leave an attacker with little choice but to 
guess the addresses of commands needed to perpetrate a 
return-to-libc attack.  However, if an attacker launches 
an attack against a vulnerable pre-forking server, such 
as that used by the Oracle 9 PL/SQL Apache module 
[33], they can utilize the fact that spawned child 
processes inherit the same virtual address space as that 
of their parent process.  As such they are suitable to 
brute force return-to-libc attacks.  The format of this 
type of attack was first laid out by Shacham [2] in 2004, 
and is explained here for the purpose of providing both 
additional detail and context.   
 A pre-forking concurrent server operates by pooling 
a number of listening processes at start up.  This offers 
superior performance to alternative concurrent server 
designs e.g. handling requests iteratively, or spawning a 
child process for each new client request [34].  The 
benefits make it a very popular method of handling 
requests for http, imap and smtp servers.   
By forking, child processes are capable of accepting 
new connections on the same listening socket as their 
parent, yet they also inherit the same virtual address 
space, see fig. 4.  This leaves them vulnerable to brute 
force attacks that continually connect and overflow the 
buffer such that the return address on the stack is 
overwritten with a guess for the address of a specific c-
library function.  An incorrect guess will result in a 
segmentation fault which causes the child process to 
terminate and a new child process to be spawned in its 
place.  Thus a process of elimination can be used to find 
a c-library function.   
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ASLR unpredictability is not extensive, on a 32 bit 
host this has been documented for PaX ASLR as 16bits 
(65536 addresses) [35].  Yet, we discovered during our 
experimentation with ASLR on Fedora and Ubuntu 
boxes that this number is significantly less.  The 
logistics of our attack are outlined in the following 
sections 
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Memory 
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Fig.4 Virtual Address Space 
A. Test bed environment 
Our attack, inspired by Shacham [2], consists of a 
reconnaissance component followed by the exploit 
itself, the latter making use of the information gleaned 
from the former. The following figure shows how our 
test environment was assembled: 
 
 
Fig. 5 Virtual Test Environment 
The test environment was created using VMware 
workstation [36], this allowed for rapid control transfer 
between guest machines via tabs.   
The attack box is also the host for the virtual 
machines and it holds the host operating system 
Microsoft Vista, along with the VMware software 
necessary to facilitate the virtual environment.  
VMware is configured to allow the use of a virtual hub 
where each of the guest machines, along with the host 
itself, is connected.  The Vista host (attack box) has a 
shared folder which is configured to allow the guest 
machines access to custom written vulnerable pre-
forking server applications.  This allowed us to test 
Ubuntu 9 and Fedora 10 buffer overflow security 
mechanisms.  The attack box also contains code to 
facilitate a brute force over the network reconnaissance 
and return-to-libc attack, allowing a remote shell to be 
opened on the victim’s machine.  The attack box 
includes Apache and the malicious application rshell 
available for download via the web server. The Snort 
box contains a copy of Wireshark [37] for capturing 
traffic to assist in rule creation, and a running copy of 
the IDS Snort [38] used to test and tune rules. 
B. Vulnerable pre-forking server (ssprocess) 
Ssprocess is a pre-forking concurrent server; it was 
written in C and compiled using GCC for use with a 
Linux operating system. The server pools a number of 
listening processes, this is specified by its parameter 
(150 child processes were selected as this is the default 
for the Apache web server) at start up.  Each child 
process is capable of accepting the connection on the 
same listening socket and executes the vulnerable 
function each time a connection is accepted and data is 
received.  This received data is copied into a buffer 
without performing bounds checking, and it is this 
simulated oversight which leaves the function open to a 
stack based buffer overflow attack.  
C. Reconassence application (NetClientExploit) 
NetClientExploit is the process responsible for 
reconnaissance.  It makes a connection to the vulnerable 
server and overflows the buffer such that the return 
address is overwritten with a guessed address for the c-
library function usleep.  8 bytes prior to this on the 
stack, i.e. usleep address guess + 8 bytes, is the 
parameter of the usleep function.  The value chosen 
is 16,000,000 so that if the usleep function was 
guessed correctly this would cause the server system to 
pause for 16 seconds.  
This is achieved by the attacking application looping 
through successive incremental guesses for the usleep 
function, repeatedly making a connection to the server 
and sending a crafted buffer to compromise the stack, as 
shown in the following figure. 
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Fig. 6 Compromised stack 
The score through sections in the figure depicts 
legitimate storage on the stack which has been 
overwritten.    During a function’s epilogue the 
following takes place  
STACK (grows down) 
. 
. 
Shared Memory, e.g. library 
functions 
. 
. 
HEAP (grows up) 
DATA - Uninitialised data (bss) 
Initialised data 
TEXT, compiled code 
• The stack pointer is replaced with the frame 
pointer, also called the Extended Base Pointer 
(EBP) i.e. mov %ebp, %esp 
• The base pointer is removed from the stack (it 
was placed there during the prologue) i.e. pop 
%ebp 
• The return address is popped from the stack 
and program execution is redirected to this 
address.  With a legitimate program this value 
would have been placed there during the “call” 
command for the function [39] . 
Considering the vulnerable function, at this point 
there are two possible outcomes; if the guess is 
incorrect, then a segmentation fault will occur.  
Segmentation faults occur when a program attempts to 
access a disallowed memory location or attempts to 
access it in an inappropriate way.   If a function, which 
is not usleep, is discovered then the program could 
attempt to execute it, however it is unlikely to execute 
correctly with an integer parameter of 16,000,000 and 
this would classify as inappropriate and a segmentation 
fault would occur.  Once a segmentation fault occurs, 
ssprocess will terminate the child process before 
launching a new child process.  Since the child inherits 
its address layout from the parent it will have an 
identical layout to the one previously terminated.  
NetClientExploit will respond to the closed connection 
by closing the socket, incrementing the guess address 
for usleep and trying again. 
If the correct guess is made then execution will 
resume from the usleep function when the vulnerable  
function exits.  During a function’s prologue the 
following occurs [20]. 
• The frame pointer is pushed onto the stack i.e. 
pushl %ebp 
• The stack pointer is copied as the frame 
pointer, making it the new frame pointer 
• Room is made on the stack for the functions 
local variables. 
The usleep function will be expecting its 
parameter 8 bytes up the stack relative to the EBP, if the 
function had been called legitimately then the parameter 
would have been placed there prior to the function’s 
“call” command, however in this instance it has been 
maliciously injected there.  As discussed usleep 
executing with the parameter 16,000,000 will cause the 
server to suspend activity while it waits 16 seconds,  
NetClientExploit times the amount of time taken for the 
vulnerable server to start accepting data on its socket 
and if it exceeds this then the correct address of 
usleep is deemed to have been found.  The location 
of c-library functions always remain constant in relation 
to each other, thus,  once the address of one function 
has been established it is a trivial exercise to determine 
the location of the others. 
1) Determining ASLR entropy  
ASLR is designed to randomise the base addresses 
of the core sections in a processes virtual address space 
[40].  This includes the base address of the c-library 
which is the target of the exploit.  In order to establish 
the value of this offset, for any given instance of 
randomisation, it was necessary to manually turn off 
address space randomisation and then determine the 
base address.  The former is performed using sysctl –w 
kernel.randomise_va_space=0 and the later established 
using cat /proc/<PID>/maps for a running process, 
where <PID> is the process identifier [41].  In the case 
of Linux Ubuntu 9 this is identified as /lib/libc-2.9.so 
and in our experiment this is at 0xb7e6f000.  The offset, 
called delta_mmap, can be established using a 
debugger, breaking at main, and displaying the address 
of usleep,  in our experiment this was 0xb7f4c110.  
The offset is thus 0xdd110 and will remain fixed 
regardless of base address randomisation.   
In order to determine if the attack has been 
successful it is necessary to establish the theoretical 
maximum number of guesses needed, if this figure is 
surpassed the attack can be deemed to have failed.  
There is little to document the level of entropy 
employed by the various distributions of Linux. 
However PaX, a Linux kernel patch which facilitates 
ASLR,   is documented as randomising the base 
addresses of the process address space for the 
executable (data and text), mapped (heap and shared 
libraries) and the stack as now described.  A random 
variable is added to each area of the section in the 
process address space, in the case of the shared library, 
this variable is called delta_mmap.  Since IA32 
architectures use a 4k page file bits 0-11 cannot be 
randomised as it would interfere with the page offset.  
In addition the high nibble (bits 28-31) is not 
randomised as this is used to allow for large memory 
mappings. This leaves 16bits of arbitrariness for base 
addresses [35].  However, while PaX has been in 
operation since 2000 [42] it is still not enforced by 
default in the majority of Linux distributions, including 
Ubuntu 9, which is being used for the experiment.  
There is, however, a basic form of ASLR which has 
been present in many Linux distributions since RedHat 
enterprise version 3 [25]. This is the Arjan van de Ven’s 
ASLR implementation.  Unfortunately the level of 
randomness provided by this mechanism isn’t implicitly 
publically documented, hence in order to determine this, 
empirical observation was performed.  This was done 
by analyzing the output of a script which ran the unix 
shell command ldd, 2   times for an arbitrary 
program. 2 times was chosen as it is documented that 
Arjan Van de Ven’s implementation has less 
randomness than PaX (16bit) therefore this should 
prove more than sufficient to ensure a complete output 
of all possible c-library locations.  The output was 
analysed and it was observed that the c-library starts at 
its lowest at address 0xb7d70000 and at its highest at 
b7f6e000.  It was also observed, as expected, that the 
final 12 bits are not randomised, this is due to 
aforementioned page offset.  Hence a maximum number 
of 0x1FE+1 or 511 guesses is needed, as given by  
m =  	
			+1 
Where m is the maximum number of guesses and u 
and l are the upper and lower limits of the start address 
for the c-library that can be randomly generated. 
During our experiment we ensured that Linux 
Ubuntu 9 was running with its default security e.g. 
ASLR and (W○+ X) were in effect.  We ran the 
NetClientExploit against ssprocess 30 times with it 
configured to spawn 150 child processes.  The results 
showed a mean average of 249 guesses needed to guess 
usleep, within 2.5% of the true value of 255.5, with 
an average time to discover it of 13.5 seconds.  Please 
note that the usleep function causes a pause for 16 
seconds in this experiment hence the total average 
reconnaissance time was 29.5 seconds.    
With the location of the usleep function 
uncovered the location of the c-library functions 
necessary to perform a return-to-libc attack were then 
calculated.  Our attack makes use the function’s 
system and exit which are 0xa38b0 and  0xaeae0 
memory locations lower in the c-library than usleep. 
D. Perpetrating the attack 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 Overview of malicious assault 
 
Step1: The attack commands are pushed into the 
vulnerable application via a buffer and flooding the 
stack. 
Step2: The attack string is executed causing the victim 
to initiate a “wget”  
Step3: The malicious application is downloaded from 
the hostile system. 
Step4: Once the malicious application has been 
downloaded and executed it sets up a connection socket 
to the malicious system which is listening for the 
incoming connection.  The standard terminal input and 
output is redirected to the socket and a shell is opened 
thus passing control to the malevolent party. 
1) Creating the attack string 
There are two challenges which need to be 
overcome to create an attack string which will result in 
the successful perpetration of this attack.  Firstly, when 
the vulnerable function exits, program execution must 
be redirected to the c-library’s system function, and 
second that a pointer to the address of the part of the 
string which constitutes the system functions 
parameter is located 8 bytes higher on the stack than the 
function [43].  The latter of these two challenges is a 
particular issue when we consider that ASLR in Ubuntu 
9 randomises the starting location of the stack.  Hence 
the injected attack string will not be successful if it 
contains a hard coded stack address pointing to the start 
address of the buffer.  To avoid the need to hardcode 
this it’s necessary to find the address of a pointer to the 
start address of the buffer, i.e. the desired system 
function’s parameter, within the stack and overwrite the 
stack such that the system function is located 8 bytes 
before it.  Our vulnerable application has such a pointer 
in the stack frame of a previous function and so this is 
achievable.  However, the side effect of modifying the 
stack in this way is that the system function will not 
be positioned over the return address for the function.  
The method of overcoming this, as documented by 
Shacham [2], involves injecting a number of iterations 
of a ret operator address between the functions 
expected return address and the address of the system 
function. This operator can easily be discovered in the 
binary of the application.  Hence ret codes are injected 
onto the stack such that they overwrite the original 
return address and continue until 12 bytes from the 
pointer to the buffer.  At this point the system 
function address is written onto the stack as shown in 
fig. 8. 
 
 
Fig. 8 Stack after malicious assault 
 
Similar to a nop sledge which allows shell code to be 
slid into, this could be considered a “ret op” sledge 
offering a similar purpose of moving through the stack.  
When the vulnerable function returns it will pop the 
address of the ret operator off the stack, change the 
instruction pointer (EIP) to this address and resume 
execution from there.  This then causes the execution of 
another ret operator and the process continues until 
the final ret in the sledge is executed and the address 
of the system function is placed in the EIP with its 
string parameter accurately located +8 bytes further on.  
Since the system parameter points to the address of 
the buffer we insert the intended system parameter 
string into the start of the buffer variable.  The string in 
our attack is: 
sh -c 'wget www.attack.com/rshell/rshell; 
chmod +x rshell;./rshell 
Executing this causes the victim’s machine to download 
the malicious application rshell, change its permission 
to ensure it is executable, and then execute it. 
 
2) Developing rshell 
The application rshell is designed to be downloaded 
and executed on the victim’s machine.  Once executed 
it makes a connection to the attack machine which is set 
listening, in our example we used the tool Netcat [44] 
for this purpose.  The application rshell makes use of 
the dup2 function  as follows; where s is the file 
descriptor for the connection to the attack box. 
dup2(s, 0);  
dup2(s, 1);  
dup2(s, 2); 
file descriptors 0,1 and 2 are the descriptors for stdin, 
stdout and stderr respectively [45].  Hence this will 
have the action of redirecting all input and output to and 
from the victim to the attack box.  The net effect of this 
is to allow the attacker control of the victim’s machine.  
Since this attack is initiated from the client and not the 
server it will mitigate protection afforded by many 
stateful packet inspection (SPI) firewalls and NIDS 
rules which trigger on “flow established to server” rules. 
IV. ATTACK MITIGATION USING HOST BASED 
PROTECTION MECHANISMS 
The previously outlined attack shows that both 
(W○+ X) and ASLR do not adequately protect against 
this form of attack.  However, since the first 
documented report of this attack method, Linux 
distributions have undergone a changes that affect the 
efficiency and viability of the attack.  This section will 
outline the affect that compiler created buffer overflow 
protection mechanisms and prelinking have had in this 
area and discuss their performance and potential for 
wide spread mitigation of the attack. 
A. Placing c-library functions below 0x01000000 
Some Linux distributions employ a protection patch 
created by the Openwall project [29] e.g. Fedora 10. 
This patch ensures that the positioning of the c-library 
functions are always below 0x1000000.  This ensures 
that if any c-library functions address is injected onto 
the stack it will include a null byte (/0).  Many of the 
dangerous non bounds checking string handling 
functions, which allow this attack to be possible, look 
for  a null byte to terminate strings e.g. strcpy. 
Hence the attack outlined here, which relies on the 
strcpy function, fails when implemented in Fedora 
core 10.  Only a fragment of the malicious string will  
be copied into the buffer as it terminates at the point it 
reaches the null byte in the system function address.  
While the Openwall Project’s patch is available for 
most Linux distributions it is not applied by default to 
many of them e.g Ubuntu 9. In addition where the patch 
is applied a similar attack can still be crafted if the 
overflow is caused using a non-bounds checking 
function which doesn’t terminate on a null byte, e.g. 
recv. 
B. Prelink  
 Due to the significant number of shared libraries 
now deployed there is a considerable performance price 
in relocating these libraries during dynamic linking.  
Prelink speeds this up by doing it in advance, 
calculating address offsets for each library to ensure 
that during execution they will not be loaded into the 
same address space, and then storing these offsets in the 
libraries themselves.   By doing this for all shared 
libraries and object files the time taken to start 
applications is reduced [45].  Unfortunately however 
Prelink is not compatible with ASLR since ASLR 
randomises the address space layout for each process on 
execution and thus negates the work done by Prelink. In 
order to address the security deficit left by disabling 
ASLR, Prelink randomly selects the address bases the 
libraries are loaded at.  However this is only done when 
Prelink is run (this is performed every 2 weeks) [46], 
rather than for each execution of a process, and thus it 
could be viewed as less effective.  Indeed this could be 
the reason that many Linux distributions have not 
enabled it by default, including Ubuntu. When 
considering its effect on perpetrating the act defined in 
this paper it is significant.  Prelink cannot randomise 
bits 0-11 as they are used for the page offset however 
unlike PaX bits 28-31 can be randomised, hence 20 bits 
of entropy.  This would increase the maximum number 
of guesses needed in the reconnaissance phase to 2	.  
This would significantly increase the amount of time 
taken to perform the reconnaissance part of attack.  Our 
experiment performed approximately 18.45 guesses per 
second, thus it would take an average of 7hrs 53 
minutes to complete the reconnaissance and determine 
the c-library function addresses.  Nevertheless once the 
reconnaissance is completed the address locations of the 
c-library functions used for all processes are known up 
to the time Prelink is run.  Since ASLR would be 
disabled on any machine with Prelink enabled this 
signifies that the attacker can perform standard return-
to-libc attacks on any buffer overflow vulnerable 
applications, pre-forking or otherwise.  Essentially then  
it could be demonstrated that while prelinking would 
cause an increase in the initial reconnaissance time, 
once it has completed the system would have an 
increased vulnerability to return-to-libc attacks. 
C. Stack guards and SSP  
The effect of the stack guard, as outlined in section II, is 
demonstrated when the vulnerable application has been 
compiled using a GCC version with SSP enabled.  To 
determine SSP’s effect on our attack we replicated the 
reconnaissance phase using Ubuntu 9 which is 
distributed with GCC v4.3.3. When attempting to 
perform the reconnaissance phase of this attack under 
this new environment the attack failed to uncover the 
address of usleep.  SSP uncovered each attempt to 
overflow the buffer and immediately terminated the 
child process thus preventing a successful overflow.  
The experiment was repeated on Fedora 10 using the 
identically compiled vulnerable application and 
matching results were observed.  While these results 
indicate that SSP is a significant tool in preventing 
buffer overflow attacks, a number of factors need to be 
considered.  Firstly SSP was not introduced into GCC  
until the release of version 4.1 on February of 2006 
[31], meaning all applications compiled using GCC 
prior to this will not be afforded its protection.  Second, 
since SSP was not enabled by default until version 4.3.3 
in January 2009 [31] any application compiled with 
GCC prior to this would be required to have the feature 
manually activated using the switch settings at 
compilation.  With the onus to do this on the developer 
it may be reasoned that either without an understanding 
of merits or possibly even an awareness of the feature, 
this might not be performed.  Further, a developer may 
choose to intentionally compile without SSP due to 
concerns over performance overhead, which has been 
recorded as up to 8% [11], [47].   In addition not all 
programs will operate correctly when compiled with 
SSP enabled, in particular software developed with the 
Gecko API [48], [49]. 
V. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS RULES 
The previous section argues that while the numerous 
host based protection mechanisms (operating system 
compiler and cpu) are effective in preventing brute 
force return-to-libc attacks their success is only assured 
if all the mechanisms are implemented on all systems 
on the network.  As previously discussed this is not 
always feasible, realistic or desirable.  An alternative 
approach could be to detect the attack at the network 
perimeter and either nullify it at that point (Intrusion 
Prevention), raise an alert to allow further analysis of 
the situation (Intrusion Detection), or to automate an 
action or actions to prevent further breaches (Active 
Response).  Each of these measures would require an 
accurate rule to be written for an IDS or IPS to ensure 
that the attack is detected with minimum, ideally nil, 
false positive or negative responses.  Sourcefire, the 
creators of the open source IDS Snort, suggest that the 
most effective way to develop a rule is to design it to 
trigger on the vulnerability rather than the specific 
exploit pattern [50] and by doing so reduce the breadth 
of the rule i.e. the number of rules required, and 
increase its precision i.e. its ability to address mutations. 
The alternative approach is to compare empirical traffic 
patterns produced while a controlled attack is taking 
place against the vulnerable application, with that of 
legitimate traffic.  Unique patterns differentiating the 
two are thus identified and used to form a rule.  While 
this later method is a quick and often high performance 
way of writing rules they often lack precision leading to 
false negatives when the attack data is slightly 
modified, or false positives while parsing legitimate 
traffic [51].   
Through this work a detailed analysis of the 
vulnerability and attack method has been gained to help 
facilitate the production of precise, high collision rate 
rules.  Since the attack outlined in this work requires 
multiple phases, both active reconnaissance and attack, 
it would seem prudent to prepare rules for all of these 
phases.  Further, to increase completeness rules should 
be created to detect not only the attack method but also 
the payload, another reason for this is the observation 
that often zero day attacks use known payloads.  By 
using this “component based rules” approach an attack 
would need to mutate on all the components, including 
the payload, simultaneously to avoid detection.  The 
rules outlined in the following sections are written 
around an attack type rather than a specific attack, 
further, they have not been created with a particular 
traffic environment in mind either.  As such they have 
been intentionally written with high precision and 
collision in mind [51].  While this reduces the speed in 
which the rules can be processed, it is the intention that 
they can be modified to make them either specific to an 
attack or traffic environment thus expediting their 
process time.  
A. Rules to detect the attack 
W ⊕ X and ASLR protection implementations are 
prevalent in most modern operating systems, thus the 
attack rules outlined here are created with the 
assumption that they are enabled.  As such code 
injection stack based buffer overflow attacks are not 
implicitly discussed.   Further, rule precision has been 
increased by focusing on the generic components of an 
attack that are unlikely to exist in legitimate traffic.  
While it is acknowledged that this presumption is 
dependent on the role of the systems on the internal 
network, the rules outlined herein would need a very 
specific set of non-malicious circumstances to trigger 
them.   
1) Rule to detect the reconnaissance attempt 
The following rule was created to detect the initial 
reconnaissance attempt of establishing the start location 
of the shared c-library: 
Rule 1 
alert tcp 192.168.10.3/32 any -> any any  
(msg:“Stack smashing brute force or DOA 
attack”; flow:to_client,established; 
flags:R; threshold: type both, track 
by_dst, count 5, seconds 5; priority: 1; 
classtype:attempted-user; sid:1234567;) 
The rule counts the number of reset messages sent from 
the server to the client in the time specified.  In this 
instance 5 reset messages received in 5 seconds will 
result in an alert; this is deemed indicative of remote 
connection brute force attempt. 
2) Rules to detect malicious injection 
Rule 2 
alert tcp 192.168.10.2/32 any -> any any 
(content: "Wget"; msg:"wget request, 
possible malicious code download 
attempt";priority: 1; 
classtype:attempted-user; sid:5234567;) 
“wget” is an application designed to retrieve 
information from web servers [45] and is inherent in 
almost all Linux distributions.  The preceding rule 
attempts to identify when a wget is attempted from the 
server.  While it could be used for a legitimate 
download such as updating software, it is considered a 
strong enough possibility as an attack to justify its 
inclusion as a rule trigger. 
Rule 3 
alert tcp any any -> 192.168.10.2/32 any 
(flow:to_server,established; content: "sh 
-c"; msg: "shell command sent from client, 
possible 
remoteattack";classtype:attempted-user; 
sid:3234567;) 
As previously discussed the attack uses a pattern of 
a repeated return operator address taken from the 
executable to manipulate the stack such that the 
system function address is placed appropriately 
relative to its argument which exists in a previous stack 
frame.  Since the address of the ret operator will 
depend upon the operating system,  any rule devised to 
look for this characteristic could not look for a 
hardcoded address. As such Snorts ‘content’ [52] 
option cannot be used.   Fortunately Snort rules allow 
the use of Perl Compatible Regular Expressions (PCRE) 
for matching [52].  Utilising PCRE the following rule 
was created: 
Rule 4 
alert tcp any any -> 193.60.151.200/24 
80,443,20,25,110,143 
(flow:to_server,established; pcre: 
([^\x00]{4})\1; msg: "repeated words, 
possible stack 
overflow";classtype:attempted-user; 
sid:9234567; rev:3;) 
The PCRE option of this rule looks for a repeated 
concurrent 4 byte pattern which contains any character 
other than null byte characters i.e 0x00.  Detection of 
repeated null bytes has to be avoided due to the 
standard practice of NIC drivers implementing Ethernet 
padding [53] using null bytes. Including these in the 
match is likely to lead to false positives.  The \1 option 
in the rule is a back reference option used to allow the 
pattern to refer back to the results of a previous match 
[54], in this instance an alert is raised if four non null 
byte characters are identified and then followed by four 
more identical characters.  This rule is discussed further 
in section 5. 
3) Rules to detect the Exploit Payload 
In this attack the payload has not been obfuscated and 
as such has identifiable Unicode text in the symbol table 
section of the Elf binary [45] which is stealthily 
downloaded via the wget command to the vulnerable 
client as part of the attack.  As discussed previously this 
malicious payload uses the dup2 function to redirect 
standard input, and standard output to a maliciously 
connected socket thus allowing the malevolent party to 
take control of the system.  Considering the prospect of 
dup2 being used as part of a rule, due consideration is 
paid to the prospect of it creating false positives.  The 
dup2 function is commonly used in Unix based pipes 
allowing 2 way communication between child and 
parent processes [55] .  In addition it is habitually used 
in connection based daemons to allow a child process to 
redirect a pipe provided by a parent process to a file 
descriptor specified by the child [56]. Once redirected, 
the parent process may optionally close the original 
pipe and/or terminate whilst the child continues to use 
the pipe.  For example, a child process may use dup2 
to redirect stderr to stdout [45].  Consequentially it 
could be possible that a rule based on this function 
could fire an alert on a legitimate upgrade of a server 
containing it.  Nevertheless dup2 is considered likely 
enough to be indicative of malicious activity and is 
included in the following rule: 
Rule5 
alert tcp any any -> 192.168.10.2/32 
any(flow:to_client,established;content: 
"dup2"; msg: "dup2 in string table, 
possible remote shell 
attack";classtype:attempted-user; 
sid:4234567;) 
In the string “bin/sh”, sh is a symbolic link in to a 
shell [45]; this could be any shell variant such as bash 
or dash.  Since it is generic it is more likely to be used 
in a malicious attack, as opposed to a specific shell 
command.  A payload being downloaded to a server 
which contains this string in the elf string table is 
considered to be potentially malicious and can be 
identified by the following rule: 
Rule 6 
alert tcp any any -> 192.168.10.2/32 any 
(flow:to_server,established; content: 
"/bin/sh"; msg: "binsh request, possible 
remote shell attack";classtype:attempted-
user; sid:2234567;) 
VI. TESTING THE RULES 
Implementation of the security mechanisms outlined 
in section IV is not universal.  Not all applications are 
complied with the necessary protection, thus benefit 
could be gained by detecting brute force return-to-libc 
attacks.  In the previous section several rules were 
created to match both the reconnaissance, malicious 
string injection and undesired download phases of the 
attack.  These generic rules act as a blueprint for more 
specific ones tuned to a particular organisations traffic.  
All of these rules were tested using the test bed 
environment outlined in section III A.  Due to the need 
for frequent repeated testing and rule modification, the 
attack traffic was captured to a pcap file during an 
initial run of the experiment.  Further iterations of the 
experiment were then performed by running the file 
through Snort while monitoring the result. 
The PCRE option component of rule 5 was initially 
tested using RegexBuddy [57] by loading the file 
containing the attack data, as discussed in section III D, 
into it.  This file was thus used within the application 
for the purposes of testing and modifying the PCRE 
option to fulfil the requirement of identifying repeated 4 
byte words. 
Once all the rules were firing using pcap data they 
were subsequently all tested again simultaneously in a 
real-time simulated attack as outlined in section IIId.   
All the rules fired as expected with zero false 
negatives. 
To test the results for false positives 294MB of 
traffic was captured from a university web server and 
replayed into Snort and the results monitored.  Initially 
some of the rules needed modifying to establish zero 
false positives, it is these modified versions that are 
included in this work. 
1) Detection and Performance testing and rule 
modification 
While it is not the intention to perform detailed 
performance testing, some minor work in this area has 
been performed. In our experiment Rule 4 alerted with 
4744 false positives; using the Basic Analysis and 
Security Engine (BASE) [58] the traffic patterns 
responsible for creating these alerts were examined.  
The alerts were being largely generated by repeated 
ASCII “A” characters which existed as part of the http 
authentication negotiation procedure [59].  It would be 
simple to write a PASS rule to allow http authentication 
traffic to pass unchecked e.g. by content checking on 
the string “Authorization: Negotiate”.  However it has 
been documented that the type of attack discussed here 
could be performed during http authentication [60] and 
thus this would increase the likelihood of false 
negatives.  An alternative approach was attempted 
which filtered out the repeated “A” characters by 
extending the PCRE component i.e.  
pcre:"/([^\x00]{4})\1([^\x41]{4})\2/" 
However this approach was abandoned as it still caused 
119 false positives, on examination these were largely 
due to the repetitive nature of binary values contained in 
image downloads.  Further to this, excessive filtering 
dependent on a solitary traffic characteristic, offsets the 
intention to keep the rules generic. In addition to the 
false positives, the rule was also CPU intensive taking 
over 25% of the total processing time when reading in 
the test traffic.  This is due to the high CPU costs 
inherent in using PCRE and as such it is desirable to use 
it after a less expensive match has prequalified the 
pattern [61].  As such it was combined with rule 3 as 
shown: 
Rule7 (combining rule 3 and 4) 
alert tcp any any -> 192.168.10.2/32 any 
(flow:to_server,established; content: "sh 
-c"; pcre: ([^\x00]{4})\1; msg: "shell 
command sent and repeated words, possible 
remote attack"; classtype:attempted-user; 
sid:3234567;) 
The new rule was tested, it did not produce any false 
positive or negatives and the resultant processing 
overhead was negligible.   
Since Rule 1 did not contain a “content:” option it 
could not make use of the fast pattern matcher 
employed by Snort and thus was applied against 
approximately 50% of the traffic during this test.  While 
initially this appears to be problem, further analysis 
shows only 2.5% of the total time spent processing the 
test traffic was spent in processing this rule. As such in 
this environment this could be deemed acceptable. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS  
In order to determine the efficacy of mainstream host 
based protection mechanisms a practical return-to-libc 
brute force attack was constructed and launched against 
a vulnerable pre-forking concurrent server. Preforking 
listening processes is a common way of creating HTTP, 
SMTP, and IMAP servers.  With the vulnerable 
application compiled using a version of GCC predating 
4.3.3, the attack was able to mitigate the protection 
offered by both W○+ X and ASLR inherent within the 
Ubuntu 9 operating system.  Compiling the application 
using GCC with the switch -fstack-protector-all 
or compiling without this switch in a version of GCC at 
4.3.3 or above, in which the option is active by default 
[31], would prevent the attack.  This is due to the 
insertion of stack guards which detect undesired 
injection onto the stack and ASLR applied to the binary 
preventing predictability of determining the address of 
return operators within the executable.  
The Openwall project suggested that the memory 
addresses of c-library functions should be located under 
0x10000000, thus ensuring if such an address was 
hardcoded as part of an attack it would contain a null 
byte and cause the malicious string to terminate without 
causing a security breach. 
Prelinking increases performance by re-locating 
shared library and object files prior to dynamic linking.  
It is incompatible with ASLR [46], is performed by 
default every fortnight and offers additional entropy 
when compared to Arjan van de Ven’s ASLR 
implementation.  Prelink affects the reconnaissance 
phase of the attack by increasing the time taken. Still, 
since it is incompatible with ASLR, once this phase had 
completed the address space for all applications would 
be known until Prelink is run.  Thus it could be argued 
that Prelink increases performance at the cost of 
security.  
Deficiencies of host based protection mechanisms 
were recognized and the residual threat of brute force 
return-to-libc attacks established.  As such Snort was 
used to demonstrate how NIDS’s can be employed to 
mitigate this threat.  Several rules were created that 
when exposed to 294mb of traffic from a universities 
web server showed no false positives.  When exposed to 
a simulated brute force return-to-libc attack each rule 
fire as expected, 100% true positive.  The processing of 
the rules exhibited an acceptable overhead.  
 When considering future work; in this study we 
discovered repeated attack patterns in the traffic.  Study 
into their detection via intelligent pattern matching 
algorithms such as the Motif tracking algorithm [62], 
could prove fruitful.  
 Further, mobile devices are becoming more 
sophisticated, acting as both peers and servers.  A 
question arises; can they be hacked in a similar method 
to that discussed in this work?  Since Android phones 
utilise a Linux kernel similar to that used in these 
experiments initiating a similar attack seems likely.  If 
so, can this risk of attack be mitigated through NIDS?  
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